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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a global vaccine race. Distributive
questions about which countries will receive scarce doses and under which
conditions pervade international law and diplomacy. This Article is the first to
describe the phenomena that have driven the development of international
vaccine-sharing mechanisms, identify the international organizational forces
that explain the phenomena, and explain how international organizations may
facilitate international cooperation before, during, and after global crises.
This Article explores the longstanding dissociation between global public
health imperatives and nationalist responses to pandemics within the
frameworks of “vaccine nationalism,” “viral sovereignty,” and “vaccine
diplomacy.” The Article then considers two international agreements indicative
of an interest in international collaborations, division of gains from trade, and
sustained governance structures—the 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework, and the 2020 COVAX Vaccines Pillar of the ACT Accelerator. The
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recurrence of these legal arrangements suggests that, to save the transaction
costs generated by repeated development of ad hoc structures that centralize
vaccine distribution, a permanent facility may be developed. One possibility for
such a facility is the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, adapted to
become an all- or most-pathogen-sharing international organization. A second
possibility, which gained some momentum during the COVID-19 pandemic, is a
Pandemic Treaty establishing the terms under which pandemic vaccines will be
developed and shared in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a global vaccine race, and
distributive questions about which countries will receive scarce doses, and under
which conditions, pervade international law and diplomacy.1 As vaccines are
1
See Eileen O’Reilly, The Coming Clash Over the First Coronavirus Vaccines, AXIOS (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-vaccine-distribution-america-a12c4e95-df80-47f0-beec-d17d7e7657db.
html (“There will not be enough vaccines to meet initial demand, experts say. That’s left nations racing to secure
future supplies and international organizations scrambling to make sure there is equitable access to any vaccines
for the novel coronavirus. . . . The COVID-19 vaccine race is underway, with at least 92 in development and
more expected. They’re based on different approaches that have different manufacturing processes: There are a
limited number of facilities that are large enough for massive scale-ups and/or are flexible enough to switch to
a different type of vaccine than they were originally intended to produce. Over the next several months, there’s
expected to be a ‘winnowing’ of these potential vaccines as data from initial trials are collected, but it will take
time before it’s known which vaccine(s) are best . . . . Having a global dialogue now on how vaccines should be
scaled up and distributed is key, experts say.”); Costas Paris & Jared S. Hopkins, Pfizer Sets Up Its ‘Biggest
Ever’ Vaccination Distribution Campaign, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2020, 6:13 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
pfizer-sets-up-its-biggest-ever-vaccination-distribution-campaign-11603272614 (“[T]he biggest complications
in distribution likely would come closer to the final point of delivery rather than the first stages of shipping.”);
Jared S. Hopkins, Covid-19 Vaccines to Be Stored Secretly Under Tight Security, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2020,
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distributed worldwide over the first few months of 2021, this Article analyzes
the problem of vaccine access as a critical question in the literature on sources
of international law and the influence of those sources.2 As with past pandemics,
research and development (R&D) capacity is largely concentrated in the wealthy
countries of Europe and North America with growing capabilities in East and
South Asia.3 Over the course of 2020, some governments exercised extreme
forms of “vaccine nationalism,” refusing to share, or contemplate sharing,
COVID-19 vaccines or related knowledge with any populations but their own.4
According to Rutschman:
As some governments began narrowing down the roster of projects
receiving priority status in late spring, the first hints of “vaccine
nationalism” appeared. The expression is linked to agreements that
reserve the bulk of emerging vaccines for a limited number of
countries, traditionally in the developed world. While these strategies
are not new, they have become a recent hallmark of negotiations
during large-scale outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases. If left
unaddressed, vaccine nationalism can have serious consequences for
equitable access to the first COVID-19 vaccines to come to market.5

Other governments balanced the needs of their domestic populations with
regional or global diplomatic objectives. 6 Within this latter category, some
governments shared bilaterally as a means of furthering local or international
influence, while others participated in a multilateral sharing mechanism

3:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-vaccines-to-be-stored-secretly-under-tight-security-1160327
8002?mod=hp_lead_pos4 (detailing the complications of vaccine theft and possible precautions that will be
taken to hopefully protect the COVID-19 vaccine from theft).
2
Gavin Yamey, A Coronavirus Vaccine Should Be for Everyone, Not Just Those Who Can Afford It,
STATNEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/05/coronavirus-vaccine-affordable-for-everyone
(“Without price controls, poor countries are unlikely to be able to afford or access enough vaccines to protect
their populations.”).
3
J. Smith, M. Lipsitch & J.W. Almond, Vaccine Production, Distribution, Access, and Uptake, 378
LANCET 428, 428–38 (2011) (“In contrast to the [Expanded Programme of Immunization] vaccines, it is a reality
that for the new and more complex vaccines, availability in developing countries lags substantially behind that
in wealthier countries. At present, the reasons are partly due to manufacturing capacities which, due to
investment cost, are seldom sufficient to satisfy global demand in the early years of licensure, and partly due to
the economic realities of companies needing to recoup R&D investment [which may be in the region of 1B $US
for a new vaccine] by prioritizing supply to markets that can sustain a high price. In the absence of specific
purchasing and supply agreements, newer vaccines are thus often unavailable or unaffordable for many countries
for extended periods.”).
4
Ana Santos Rutschman, The Reemergence of Vaccine Nationalism, GEO. J. INT’L AFFS. ONLINE (July 3,
2020), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/07/03/the-reemergence-of-vaccine-nationalism.
5
Id. (citation omitted).
6
Aurélia Nguyen, COVAX Governance Explained, GAVI (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/
vaccineswork/covax-facility-governance-explained.
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coordinated by international organizations.7 Of course, as with past pandemics,
the great majority of governments were left without vaccine development and
manufacturing capacity, possessed few resources with which to procure
vaccines under prevailing commercial circumstances, and were therefore
vulnerable and open to overtures from both bilateral and multilateral acquisition
sources.8
As Adam Hancock noted in the EU Observer:
Inequality in vaccine coverage between rich and poor countries is
stark. More than 1.5 million people die from vaccine-preventable
diseases every year around the world, with the vast majority of these
deaths in low-income countries.
Coronavirus is only making things worse.
The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (Gavi) recently
announced that 80 million children in at least 68 countries may now
be at risk of contracting a range of regular diseases after the pandemic
heavily disrupted routine immunisation programmes.
Systems to deliver and administer vaccines have been hit by a mixture
of travel restrictions, delivery delays and people choosing not to leave
their homes to be vaccinated due to the ever present threat of infection.
If this continues, health experts fear that low income countries won’t
be able to effectively administer a new coronavirus vaccine.
“If we neglect the supply chains and immunisation infrastructure that
keep these programmes running, we also risk harming our ability to
roll out the Covid-19 vaccine that represents our best chance of
defeating this pandemic,” said Gavi chief executive Seth Berkley.

7
Oliver Stuenkel, Vaccine Diplomacy Boosts China’s Standing in Latin America, FOREIGN POL’Y
(June 11, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/11/vaccine-diplomacy-boosts-china-in-latin-america (“Yet
none of this has dampened China’s strategic advantage for a simple reason: It has been running largely
unopposed. This has allowed Beijing to project itself as Latin America’s most trusted ally in times of hardship,
when other powers failed to respond. So far, the numbers are indeed on Beijing’s side. By mid-May, China had
exported more than 250 million doses overall, or 42 percent of its total production, while the United States had
only exported 3 million doses, about 1 percent of its production. It has not been lost on observers in the region
that more than half of China’s total exports—roughly 165 million doses—have been administered in Latin
America. In Brazil, for example, the majority of all shots given by late May were made with Chinese raw
materials.”); see also Alexander Smith, Russia and China Are Beating the U.S. at Vaccine Diplomacy, Experts
Say, NBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-china-are-beating-u-s-vaccinediplomacy-experts-say-n1262742 (further describing vaccine diplomacy strategies adopted by some national
governments); Nguyen, supra note 6 (detailing the structure and dynamics of international vaccine procurement
coordinated by international organizations).
8
Adam Hancock, Why Developing Countries May Be the Last to Get the Vaccine, EU OBSERVER
(May 28, 2020), https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/148470.
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Traditionally, the cost of securing vaccines has always hindered
developing countries. To put it bluntly, they simply can’t afford most
of the new vaccines being produced.9

This Article aims to explain this unique constellation of vaccine
development and access from the lens of international law, focusing on the
nascent global governance regime for vaccine research, development, and
distribution. As wealthy governments used bilateral contracts—Advanced
Purchase Agreements (APAs)—to secure vaccines for populations in the
world’s richest countries, those in poor countries remained at risk.10 Yet both
multilateral and bilateral mechanisms emerged that prioritized vaccine access to
those populations, an occurrence arguably at odds with realpolitik conceptions
of how and why governments assess their legal options during international
emergencies. We explore this dissociation between global public health
imperatives and nationalist responses to the pandemic within the frameworks of
“vaccine diplomacy,” “vaccine nationalism,” and “viral sovereignty.” The
Article ultimately argues that, over the course of the last thirty years, a global
regime of vaccine access has emerged and, while not yet cohesive or uniform, it
has manifested common characteristics through two vaccine-preventable global
public health emergencies: H1N1 pandemic influenza and COVID-19.11 A third,
more regional epidemic, Ebola, demonstrated similar characteristics. 12 Even
9

Id.
Ewen Callaway, The Unequal Scramble for Coronavirus Vaccines—By the Numbers, NATURE
(Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02450-x (“Wealthy countries have struck deals
to buy more than two billion doses of coronavirus vaccine in a scramble that could leave limited supplies in the
coming year. Meanwhile, an international effort to acquire vaccines for low-and middle-income countries is
struggling to gain traction. . . . By mid-August, the United States had secured 800 million doses of at least 6
vaccines in development, with an option to purchase around one billion more. The United Kingdom was the
world’s highest per-capita buyer, with 340 million purchased: around 5 doses for each citizen. The European
Union nations—which are buying vaccines as a group—and Japan have locked down hundreds of millions of
doses of vaccines for themselves . . . .”); see also Ernst R. Berndt & John A. Hurvitz, Vaccine Advance-Purchase
Agreements for Low-Income Countries: Practical Issues, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 653 (2005) (describing the general
design of vaccine APAs).
11
See Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2011),
https://apps.who.int/gb/pip/pdf_files/pandemic-influenza-preparedness-en.pdf (“The objective of the Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness Framework is to improve pandemic influenza preparedness and response, and strengthen
the protection against the pandemic influenza by improving and strengthening the WHO global influenza
surveillance and response system [‘WHO GISRS’], with the objective of a fair, transparent, equitable, efficient,
effective system for, on an equal footing: (i) the sharing of H5N1 and other influenza viruses with human
pandemic potential; and (ii) access to vaccines and sharing of other benefits.”).
12
Sam F. Halabi, Michelle Rourke & Rebecca Katz, The Effect of Proprietary and Attribution Claims on
Data Sharing During Infectious Disease Emergencies, 23 J. HEALTHCARE L. & POL’Y, 203, 205 (2020)
(“Biomedical firms, largely working from research funded by Canadian and U.S. militaries, accelerated the
development of therapeutics and vaccines. Several firms worked in partnership with the ministries of health of
the affected countries, including the WHO, the U.S. National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID), and the Norwegian Institute of Public Health.”).
10
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more importantly, this regime has been formed and implemented by
international organizations, rather than coordinated through individual
governments.13
Within the broader context of international law scholarship, this Article
contributes a significant case for international organizations as international lawmakers. 14 The Article focuses on two international agreements—the 2011
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, and the 2020 COVAX
Vaccines Pillar of the ACT Accelerator (COVAX)—neither of which is a treaty,
neither of which codifies customary international law as it would be
conventionally defined, but both of which have been negotiated and
implemented by international organizations. 15 These organizations include
specialized U.N. agencies like the World Health Organization (WHO) and
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), as well as international
organizations technically formed under national law, but which include a
broader set of decision-makers (including governments) like the Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and the Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI). 16 Each agreement represented a legal
13
Cf. Rita Guerreiro Teixeira, The Role of International Organizations in the Development of
International Environmental Law: Adjusting the Lenses of Analysis, 53 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 237 (2021)
(“International organizations have gradually moved beyond constituting mere fora for negotiations between
states and have assumed a more active role in law-making. . . . For example, the UN has convened the Global
Conferences, leading to the adoption of foundational declarations of principles, and numerous other international
organizations have prepared draft texts, promoted the conclusion of environmental agreements, adopted
standards, guidelines and recommendations, and prepared influential studies. Additionally, novel institutional
arrangements have been established by multilateral environmental agreements, which often include a
Conference of the Parties empowered to develop the treaty obligations through innovative legislative processes
which do not always require consent by all state parties.”).
14
See generally JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS (2006) (arguing
that states delegate various types of authority to international organizations: lawmaking, providing technical
assistance by setting standards and recommended practices, facilitating loans to governments and foreign
investments, facilitating dispute settlement between them, and making binding decisions).
15
Seth Berkley, COVAX Explained, GAVI (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covaxexplained; The Scramble for Vaccines and the COVAX Facility, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 1, 3
(Aug. 19, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200811_
Scramble_Vaccines.pdf; Donor Profiles, GAVI (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/funding/
donor-profiles; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., The Development of the PIP Framework: Global
Lessons on Equity and Fairness for Pandemic Preparedness, in EXPLORING LESSONS FROM A CENTURY OF
OUTBREAKS: READINESS FOR 2030: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP (A. Nicholson et al. eds., 2019), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK544063 (describing the PIP Framework as not binding).
16
Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus
for Readers, 92 AM. J. INT’L. L. 291 (1999) (explaining the proliferation of actors and influences on international
law); Sam F. Halabi, The Origins and Future of Global Health Law: Regulation, Security, and Pluralism, 108
GEO. L.J. 1607, 1621 (2020) (“Between 1977 and 1979, the regulation of corporations became part of WHO’s
broader strategy in ensuring infant and children’s health. Regulating corporations also shifted the global-healthlawmaking approach from making recommendations to states to directly regulating nonstate actors through law.
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solution to disputes between high-income countries seeking to hoard medicines
for their citizens, and low-income countries seeking greater shares of vaccines
manufactured in high-income countries. 17 Yet realizing those agreements
depended on the coordinating and facilitating efforts of international
organizations, rather than by individual or collective action by governments.
The importance of this development is significant not only in the context of
sources of international law, but in the relative influence of those sources.
Vaccine diplomacy—the efforts of primarily China, India, and Russia to use
access to COVID-19 vaccines for regional or international influence—has been
fundamentally shaped by international organizations advocating an international
norm of vaccine access codified in multilateral legal instruments.18 COVAX has
conditioned the diplomatic outcomes China, India, and Russia may realize
through vaccine diplomacy.
The international norm of vaccine access did not emerge because of altruism
or self-interest. Rather, it represents a brokered institutional compromise
between vaccine nationalism and viral sovereignty—the proprietary claims over
pathogens by mainly biodiverse countries that limit access to the genetic
resources necessary for the development of many therapeutics and vaccines.19
This practice was bidirectional: not only did WHO seek to regulate corporations but also to negotiate the terms
of the regulation with the firms themselves.”).
17
Sam F. Halabi, Viral Sovereignty, Intellectual Property, and the Changing Global System for Sharing
Pathogens for Infectious Disease Research, 28 ANNALS HEALTH L. 101, 104, 119 (2019) (“While Indonesia’s
withholding of H5N1 samples generated greater systems for benefit sharing both in the short-term and through
the 2011 WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, it presented a major threat to global public
health. As David Fidler, a global expert on the law of infectious diseases, noted, ‘[w]ithout access to Indonesia’s
influenza strains, global surveillance was jeopardized, as was the refinement of diagnostic reagents and the
development of intervention strategies, which depend on the information surveillance provides.’ At that point in
time, H5N1 exhibited a sixty percent fatality rate among those infected, and its potential to spread more easily
between humans was unknown.”).
18
Smith, supra note 7 (“Soon after Moscow sold 5.2 million doses of its Sputnik V vaccine, President
Vladimir Putin was on the phone with his Bolivian counterpart, Luis Arce, in late January, discussing topics as
varied as building a nuclear power plant to lithium mining and gas reserves. In North Africa, Algeria didn’t pay
a dime for the Chinese vaccines that arrived in March. What it did offer was to support Beijing’s ‘core interests’
and oppose interference in its ‘internal affairs’—language China has used to defend against criticism over Hong
Kong’s autonomy and allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which it denies. Although China and
Russia deny it, experts say they are beginning to see how Beijing’s and Moscow’s strategy of selling or donating
their vaccines abroad is greasing the wheels of their international relationships and allowing them to expand
their influence throughout the world. It’s a development that should cause grave concern for the United States
and other democracies, according to former U.S. ambassadors and other ex-diplomats. What rankles these
observers is not that China and Russia are winning at vaccine diplomacy, it’s that the U.S. and others aren’t even
in the game yet. Washington and its allies have instead chosen to prioritize their domestic populations, keeping
most doses at home and causing resentment abroad.”); PETER HOTEZ, PREVENTING THE NEXT PANDEMIC:
VACCINE DIPLOMACY IN A TIME OF ANTI-SCIENCE (2021).
19
Halabi, supra note 17, at 119–20 (2019) (“In the context of MERS-CoV, some argue that the dispute
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Without that access, there may be no vaccines; and without vaccines, there may
be no vaccine nationalism. This balance has resulted in consecutive international
legal arrangements, mostly facilitated by WHO, that indicate an interest in
collaboration, division of gains from trade, and sustained governance structures:
the PIP Framework and COVAX. The recurrence of these legal arrangements
suggests that to save the transaction costs generated by repeated development of
ad hoc structures that centralize vaccine distribution, a permanent facility may
be developed. One possibility for such a facility is the PIP Framework, adapted
to become an all- or most-pathogen-sharing international organization. 20 A

between the Erasmus Medical Center and the Saudi government caused substantial delays in researchers’ access
to viral samples. According to the Saudi Ministry of Health, Erasmus had obtained the virus illegally and the
conditions it imposed on other researchers delayed development of treatments and vaccines. Negotiations
between the U.S. and Saudi governments for virus samples involved elaborate demands for research in Saudi
territory, participation by Saudi scientists, and other technological requirements. Similar difficulties emerged
after clusters of microcephaly and other neurological disorders in newborns were associated with the Zika virus
in Brazil in 2015. Even before cases became known in the United States, Paulo Gadelha, President of Fiocruz, a
major Brazilian research institution, said he could not send samples abroad due to a new Brazilian law that
protects national genetic resources. Researchers at the CDC relied on Zika viruses taken from earlier outbreaks
in French Polynesia to work on Zika diagnostics, and other researchers attempted to sequence Zika’s genetic
code using virus samples from Puerto Rico. In the U.K., researchers used samples drawn from Micronesia, the
site of an outbreak in 2007. The French relied on samples from Polynesia and Martinique. In Spain scientists
used a Ugandan strain of Zika supplied by the United States. Even scientists in Portugal, a country that shares
extensive cooperative ties to Brazil, had to work with a U.S. sample from the 1980s. The result was, again,
delays in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccine candidates for the vector-borne illness.”).
While China shared the genetic sequence of SARS-CoV-2 in January 2020, sharing of live samples was delayed.
China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating WHO, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 1, 2020), https://
apnews.com/article/united-nations-health-ap-top-news-virus-outbreak-public-health-3c061794970661042b18
d5aeaaed9fae (“Throughout January, the World Health Organization publicly praised China for what it called a
speedy response to the new coronavirus. It repeatedly thanked the Chinese government for sharing the genetic
map of the virus ‘immediately,’ and said its work and commitment to transparency were ‘very impressive, and
beyond words.’ But behind the scenes, it was a much different story, one of significant delays by China and
considerable frustration among WHO officials over not getting the information they needed to fight the spread
of the deadly virus, The Associated Press has found. Despite the plaudits, China in fact sat on releasing the
genetic map, or genome, of the virus for more than a week after three different government labs had fully
decoded the information. Tight controls on information and competition within the Chinese public health system
were to blame, according to dozens of interviews and internal documents. Chinese government labs only released
the genome after another lab published it ahead of authorities on a virologist website on Jan. 11. Even then,
China stalled for at least two weeks more on providing WHO with detailed data on patients and cases, according
to recordings of internal meetings held by the U.N. health agency through January—all at a time when the
outbreak arguably might have been dramatically slowed.”); Amy Maxmen, Divisive Covid Lab Leak Debate
Prompts Dire Warning from Researchers, NATURE (May 27, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586021-01383-3.
20
Bingzhe Li et al., Expanding the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework to the Epidemic of
COVID-19, 54 ZHONGHUA YU FANG YI XUE ZA ZHI [CHINESE J. PREVENTIVE MED.] 597, 597–601 (2020)
(“Since the transmission route and transmission capacity of COVID-19 are similar to that of influenza A [H1N1]
in 2009, which conforms to the basic elements of ‘human pandemic’, and the epidemic scale has exceeded that
of influenza A [H1N1]，it is probable to incorporate COVID-19 epidemic response into PIPF, and at the same
time to verify and improve PIPF in practice. It is recommended that WHO, other international organizations and
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second possibility has been introduced in light of the COVID-19 pandemic: a
Pandemic Treaty that establishes the terms under which pandemic vaccines will
be developed and shared in the future.
Whatever alternative materializes, this Article is the first to describe the
phenomena that have driven the development of international vaccine sharing
mechanisms, identify the international organizational forces that explain the
phenomena, and explain how international organizations may facilitate
international cooperation before, during, and after global crises.
I.

VACCINE NATIONALISM

Vaccine nationalism describes situations in which “countries prioritize their
own vaccine needs,” failing to take into account those of populations located
elsewhere in the world. 21 This prioritization is achieved through bilateral
channels, when a country negotiates individually with one or more
pharmaceutical companies and reserves a significant amount of initial vaccine
doses.22 This particular form of nationalism is typically operationalized through
orders placed before a vaccine has been granted market authorization or
approval by drug regulators. Through APAs, buyers communicate interest in a
vaccine candidate, giving suppliers an economic incentive to bring the candidate
through the R&D pipeline and regulatory review as quickly as possible.23 As
regulators greenlight the use of a vaccine, the obligations set forth in an APA

relevant countries make full use of the PIPF system to respond to the epidemic and better coordinate national
actions at the global level.”).
21
Harry Kretchmer, Vaccine Nationalism—and How it Could Affect Us All, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 6,
2021),
www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/01/what-is-vaccine-nationalism-coronavirus-its-affects-covid-19pandemic (“As COVID-19 vaccines are developed and approved, national leaders face a dilemma: which to
prioritize—country or planet? Both, most people would answer. Nonetheless, ‘vaccine nationalism,’ where
countries prioritize their own vaccine needs, is forecast to handicap not just the global health recovery but the
economic one, too, with one report estimating its impact at more than $1 trillion per year. That’s because
although progress has been made through initiatives like COVAX [the global effort to ensure access to COVID19 vaccines for all countries], the majority of the world’s poor are still unlikely to be immunized in 2021—
prolonging disruption. The world’s richest nations have pre-ordered billions of doses of vaccines—enough to
protect some populations several times over. However, in doing so they have left less for others and may push
up treatment prices, too.”).
22
See id.
23
Mark Eccleston-Turner, Vaccine Procurement During an Influenza Pandemic and the Role of Advance
Purchase Agreements: Lessons From 2009-H1N1, 11 GLOB. PUB. HEALTH 322, 327 (2016) (“A 2009 survey by
the WHO of pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers asked whether they would be willing to reserve 10% of
real-time production for acquisition by UN agencies, 14 out of 25 were unable to meet the request to set aside
10% of their production capacity, because they were constrained by meeting the volume of vaccines reserved
via APAs . . . .”).
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mature into the legal framework governing the immediate purchase of vaccine
doses.24
Contractual bilateralism might appear efficient, as it incentivizes suppliers
to come to market in a timely fashion while diminishing uncertainty and delays
at the time the vaccines become commercially available.25 Yet, in situations of
product scarcity, vaccine nationalism is bound to benefit those with greater
resources, while further disadvantaging those with more limited buying
capacity, bargaining power, or both. As illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic,
the global vaccine manufacturing infrastructure is ill-equipped to produce
enough doses to meet pandemic—and in some cases even epidemic—demand
for vaccines. By capturing a substantial amount of vaccine during a period of
heightened vaccine scarcity, countries with the highest bargaining and
purchasing power thus have the ability to effectively exclude or drastically limit
the ability of other countries to gain timely access to critically-needed vaccines.
This outcome should not come as a surprise to so-called “realists” who
emphasize the idea that “[g]eopolitical calculations have shaped national
responses to COVID-19[.]”26 Vaccine nationalism highlights how “[n]ational
policies are rarely based on what is thought to be just. They are almost always
based instead on a country’s pragmatic perception of what is in its selfinterest.”27
24
Sam F. Halabi, Obstacles to pH1N1 Vaccine Availability: The Complex Contracting Relationship
Between Vaccine Manufacturers, WHO, Donor and Beneficiary Governments, in PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO
2009 H1N1: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 203 (Michael A. Stoto & Melissa A. Higdon eds., 2015).
25
Questions and Answers on Vaccine Negotiations, EUR. UNION (Jan. 8, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_21_48 (“In the negotiation process, Member States tell the
Commission how much of a certain vaccine they want to order. But they are then responsible for purchasing the
vaccines when they become available, once they prove to be safe and effective. The Commission does not sign
contracts for deliveries to individual countries. Advance Purchasing Agreements allow the Commission to secure
a certain number of doses. It is then for Member States to purchase these doses, activate potential options
included in the APA to order additional doses, and conclude specific contracts with the companies.”).
26
David P. Fidler, Vaccine Nationalism’s Politics, 369 SCI. MAG., Aug. 14, 2020, at 749 (“However, the
politics of the coronavirus catastrophe do not reflect such national interests or international solidarity. ‘Vaccine
nationalism’ is more evidence that efforts to elevate health cooperation—and the sciences that inform it—have
produced more rhetoric than political roots within countries and the international community. Concerns about
vaccine nationalism were escalating even before the United States announced on 31 July its largest deal to date
with pharmaceutical companies to secure COVID-19 vaccines. Other countries—including China, India, the
United Kingdom, and members of the European Union—are pursuing similar strategies. To critics, this scramble
to secure vaccine supplies is one of many decisions by governments that have failed to control spread of the
virus, destroyed economic activity, and damaged international cooperation. Ineffective nationalistic policies
appear to create a gap between science and politics that makes the pandemic worse and undermines what science
and health diplomacy could achieve. In fact, vaccine nationalism reflects ‘business as usual’ in global health.”).
27
James Bacchus, The Antidote to Vaccine Nationalism, CTR. INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Dec.
21, 2020), www.cigionline.org/articles/antidote-vaccine-nationalism (“The world is rightly celebrating the
unprecedented speed with which vaccines for COVID-19, the novel coronavirus, are approaching manufacture
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A. Vaccine Nationalism: Polio, Smallpox, and Influenza
Vaccine nationalism is not new. 28 Vaccine nationalism patterns occurred
during the rollout of the smallpox and polio vaccines, which were only available
to developing countries after high-income states secured enough doses to
vaccinate their domestic populations. 29 The first vaccines against polio were
developed collaboratively between the United States and Soviet Union in the
1950s. 30 Polio declined rapidly in wealthy countries over the course of the
1950s.31 It took many more decades, however, to eradicate the disease in most
poorer countries, and there remain pockets of endemic polio in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.32

and distribution stages. When COVID-19 vaccines become widely available, millions of lives can be saved, and
the loss of US $375 billion to the global economy every month can be prevented. Yet, while billions of people
worldwide await their doses of the new vaccines, many countries are also courting ‘the tragedy of vaccine
nationalism.’ With potentially lethal global consequences, these countries are giving unwise priority to the
immediate universal national vaccination of their own citizens instead of to a scientifically targeted national and
international vaccination, which would be the most effective means of saving lives everywhere and should be
the global goal during the COVID-19 pandemic. Wherever we may live, giving preference to vaccinating our
fellow nationals who are the least at risk of COVID-19 infection over people from other countries who are the
most at risk is not only morally wrong, but also contrary to our national self-interest. To provide the most
protection to people from anywhere, the COVID-19 vaccines must be distributed in ways that will save the most
lives everywhere. They must not be deployed in ways that will hasten the turn away from internationalism and
toward an insular nationalism. Vaccine nationalism will save fewer lives, and it will pull the nations of the world
farther apart at a time when the world must unite to confront the global emergency of the COVID-19
pandemic.”); Muhammad Zaheer Abbas, Practical Implications of “Vaccine Nationalism”: A Short-Sighted and
Risky Approach in Response to COVID-19 18 (S. Ctr., Research Paper No. 124, Nov. 2020), https://www.
southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/RP-124.pdfaccessed (“To end the COVID-19 pandemic and ensure
a return of normalcy, an effective and safe vaccine is the best hope. The vaccine nationalism approach, adopted
by some countries to gain preferential access to emerging COVID-19 vaccines, poses a threat to the fair and
equitable distribution of the potential vaccines across the globe . . . . [V]accine nationalism [is] self-centred
political behaviour of leaving others behind [and] is short-sighted, potentially risky, morally indefensible, and
practically inefficient in containing the pandemic . . . . [I]t is important for national governments to support the
collaborative and coordinated effort of the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) facility for the timely
development and efficient delivery of potential COVID-19 vaccines. It concludes that an effective response to
the current health and economic crisis should be guided by values of international solidarity, multilateralism,
equality, and global collaboration.”).
28
Kretchmer, supra note 21 (“Is vaccine nationalism new? In a word, no. A similar pattern was seen
during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Before that, vaccines for smallpox and polio were only available in
developing nations after developed countries had secured enough stocks for domestic needs. Indeed, historic
limitations in international cooperation may have spurred the development of home-grown immunological
capabilities among countries such as China and India. But while there may be a certain inevitability to nations’
desires to protect themselves first, such decisions have consequences for all.”).
29
See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 26, at 749.
30
Peter J. Hotez & K.M. Venkat Narayan, Restoring Vaccine Diplomacy, 325 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 2337,
2337 (June 15, 2021).
31
History of Polio, BBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-17045202.
32
Id.
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Similarly, smallpox ravaged the global population equally between rich and
poor until the twentieth century, killing an estimated 300 to 500 million people
in that century alone.33 In the United States, individual states like Massachusetts
required smallpox vaccination, leading to the spread of immunization policies
across North America and Europe. Many wealthy countries had eliminated
smallpox by 1900, and by 1914, the incidence in most industrialized countries
had decreased to comparatively low levels.34 It took a global effort led by WHO
to mobilize the resources necessary to eliminate smallpox in poor countries as
late as 1980.35
Vaccine nationalism was also illustrated during the pandemic that preceded
COVID-19: the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 36 This was the first global
influenza pandemic of the twenty-first century and the second pandemic caused
by the H1N1 influenza strain, which originally triggered the 1918–1920 Spanish
Flu pandemic.37
The 2009 Flu Pandemic started in April in North America and quickly spread
across the world, commencing a vaccine race. 38 A month into the outbreak,
several higher-income countries negotiated APAs that reserved most of the
earliest doses of vaccine.39 At the time, it was estimated that, in a best-case
scenario, global capacity for short-term vaccine manufacturing was between one
and two billion doses.40 Against this backdrop, the United States alone entered
into agreements that reserved up to 600,000 doses of the first batch of vaccines
to be produced targeting the novel strand of H1N1.41 Other developed or quasi33
Kelsey Piper, Smallpox Used to Kill Millions of Humans Every Year. Here’s How Humans Beat It,
VOX (Feb. 5, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/21493812/smallpox-eradication-vaccinesinfectious-disease-covid-19.
34
W.A. ORENSTEIN & S.A. PLOTKIN, VACCINES (3d ed. 1999).
35
See also Halabi, supra note 16 (analyzing the constitutional authorities WHO may use to effect
international law and its general hesitation to do so); Smallpox, WHO, https://www.who.int/health-topics/
smallpox#tab=tab_1.
36
SAM HALABI & REBECCA KATZ, VIRAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (2020).
37
Darisuren Anhlan et al., Origin of the 1918 Pandemic H1N1 Influenza: A Virus as Studied by Codon
Usage Patterns and Phylogenetic Analysis, 17 RNA 64, 64–73 (2011).
38
Ignacio Mena et al., Origins of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic in Swine in Mexico, ELIFE (Jan. 28,
2016); Paul C. Hébert & Noni MacDonald, The H1N1 Vaccine Race: Can We Beat the Pandemic?, 181 CAN.
MED. ASS’N J. E125 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2761457.
39
See David Brown, Most of Any Vaccine for New Flu Strain Could Be Claimed by Rich Nations’
Preexisting Contracts, WASH. POST (May 7, 2009), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/
06/AR2009050603760.html.
40
Id.
41
Ana Santos Rutschman, How Academics Can Address Rise in Vaccine Nationalism, UNIV. WORLD
NEWS (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20210413081054270 (“The
United States alone, for example, pre-ordered 600,000 doses of H1N1 vaccines. This left lower-income countries
facing a very long waiting period for additional doses of vaccine to be made available to them. Vaccine
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developed economies negotiated similar pre-production agreements.42 Outside
of APAs, approximately fifty-six percent of vaccine manufacturers surveyed
could guarantee ten percent of real-time vaccine production for purchase by
U.N. agencies to support low-income countries.43 As the pandemic unfolded,
however, several high-income countries pledged to donate H1N1 vaccines to
lower-income countries, a pattern of conduct that ran in parallel with the
development of a multilateral pandemic-influenza vaccine-sharing
mechanism.44
B. Vaccine Nationalism: SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19
Vaccine nationalism reemerged again during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
policy followed by the United States is instructive. The United States relied on
a public-private partnership known as Operation Warp Speed (OWS) as the
primary mode to procure COVID-19 vaccines. The partnership supported work
on six vaccine candidates through the provision of direct funding, as well as the
use of APAs to secure millions of doses of vaccine: by March 2021, these
contractual agreements accounted for the purchase of over one billion doses by
the U.S. government, all of which were dedicated to the U.S. market.45
nationalism is a repeat-player game. In 2020, as demand for COVID-19 vaccines spiked, higher-income
countries were again at the front of the pre-order line: even before the first COVID-19 vaccines came to market,
32 countries had reserved more than 50% of the global supply of vaccines. This group of countries included the
states that form the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan.
Collectively, they account for 13% of the world’s population.”).
42
See Brown, supra note 39.
43
Alexandra L. Phelan et al., Legal Agreements: Barriers and Enablers to Global Equitable COVID-19
Vaccine Access, 396 LANCET 800, 800–801 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31873-0 (“APAs are
legally binding contracts whereby one party, such as a government, commits to purchasing from a vaccine
manufacturer a specific number or percentage of doses of a potential vaccine at a negotiated price if it is
developed, licensed, and proceeds to manufacture. These bilateral agreements often secure priority access to
vaccine and manufacturing capacity. Governments of countries that disagree with the ethics and effectiveness
of APAs or that do not have the financial resources to purchase vaccines at comparable prices or engage in
commercial negotiations are at risk of not having access to vaccines when they first become available and of
having access delays while manufacturing capacity is fulfilled first by wealthy countries’ orders. This was the
case during the 2009 influenza A H1N1 pandemic when many APAs held by high-income countries (HICs) were
used to secure their priority access to vaccine, making procurement in other countries more difficult. APAs were
used so extensively in 2009 that more than 56% of pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers surveyed by WHO
were unable to commit to guaranteeing 10% of real-time vaccine production for purchase by UN agencies due
to pre-existing commitments under APAs with HICs. Governments that enter into APAs for candidate vaccines
that do not demonstrate evidence of safety and efficacy also risk not getting immediate or sufficient access to
successful vaccine candidates.”).
44
Margaret Chan, Pandemic Vaccine Donations for the Developing World, WHO (Sept. 18, 2009),
www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/pandemic_vaccine_donations_20090918/en.
45
SIMI SIDDALINGAIAH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN11560, OPERATION WARP SPEED CONTRACTS FOR
COVID-19 VACCINES AND ANCILLARY VACCINATION MATERIALS (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/IN/IN11560 (“Operation Warp Speed [OWS[ is an interagency partnership between the Department
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While making OWS its primary vaccine procurement tool, the U.S.
government sought to further diversify its vaccine candidate portfolio during the
earlier stages of the pandemic. In March 2020, the German press reported that
the White House approached German biotech company CureVac in an attempt
to guarantee exclusive access to its vaccine. The German government warded
off this effort by a foreign government to lay claims to CureVac’s vaccine
candidate, noting that “Germany is not for sale” and that “if a vaccine is
developed in Germany, then it is for Germany and the world.”46 A few months
later, the German government invested €300 million (roughly $337 million
USD) to guarantee a twenty-three percent stake in CureVac.47
of Health and Human Services [HHS] and the Department of Defense [DOD] that coordinates federal efforts to
accelerate the development, acquisition, and distribution of COVID-19 medical countermeasures. Collaborating
HHS components include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], the National Institutes of
Health [NIH], and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority [BARDA]. OWS is a Trump
Administration initiative, and while the Biden Administration has indicated that the interagency response to
COVID-19 will continue, it plans to restructure and rename the effort. Although the stated goals of OWS include
therapeutics and diagnostics, most of the money awarded to date has focused on vaccines. This Insight
summarizes OWS’s vaccine-related contracts, including those for ancillary vaccination materials [e.g., needles
and vials]. BARDA is currently supporting six vaccine candidates through funding research and development,
funding increases in manufacturing capacity, and/or advance purchase contracts. A vaccine candidate from
Merck/IAVI also received funding support from BARDA, but was discontinued in January 2021 because it failed
to demonstrate sufficient efficacy against COVID-19.”).
46
Hans Von Der Burchard & Jakob Hanke Vela, EU Weighs into German-American Spat Over Vaccine
Company, POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2020), www.politico.eu/article/eu-weighs-into-german-american-spat-overvaccine-company (“After days of being identified as the bad guys in the EU coronavirus saga—for banning the
export of medical equipment within Europe—German politicians are now queuing up for an opportunity to
portray themselves as defenders of the public in Europe and beyond. Economy Minister Peter Altmaier said
‘Germany is not for sale,’ while Health Minister Jens Spahn on Sunday insisted to public broadcaster ZDF that
CureVac would develop any potential coronavirus vaccine ‘for the whole world’ and ‘not for individual
countries.’ Foreign Minister Heiko Maas told the Funke media group on Monday that ‘we cannot allow others
to seek exclusive results.’”); see, e.g., Andy Gregory, “This Should Be Worldwide, Not Regional”: German Drug
Firm Chief Rebukes Trump “Attempt to Monopolise Vaccine”, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 16, 2020) (quoting Helge
Braun),
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/coronavirus-vaccine-trump-germany-us-dietmar-hoppcarevac-a9404646.html (“The owner of a German drug manufacturer has delivered an apparent rebuke to Donald
Trump after the White House was accused of trying to procure a coronavirus vaccine it is developing—but ‘only
for the United States’. Mr. Trump offered ‘large sums of money’ to German biopharmaceutical firm CureVac to
move its vaccine research to the US, with a view to securing exclusive rights to the resulting drug, Die Welt
reported. The German government then scrambled to financially incentivise the drug firm to remain in the
country, according to the report—published on the front page of the paper’s Sunday edition under the headline:
‘Trump versus Berlin.’”).
47
Barbara Kollmeyer, Germany Investing in Coronavirus Vaccine Maker that It Accused the Trump
Administration of Trying to Poach, MARKETWATCH (June 15, 2020), www.marketwatch.com/story/germanyinvesting-in-coronavirus-vaccine-maker-that-it-accused-the-trump-administration-of-trying-to-poach-2020-0615 (“The German government has taken a stake in privately held biotech group CureVac—the company it
accused the U.S. of trying to lure away as the coronavirus pandemic was starting to spread in Europe and the
U.S. earlier this year. Germany’s federal minister for economic affairs and energy, Peter Altmaier, and Dietmar
Hopp, co-founder of software group SAP SE and of the investment company dievini Hopp BioTech holding
GmbH & Co. KG, jointly announced the government would invest €300 million [$337 million] in CureVac,
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The French government also intervened to stymie APA negotiations
between the French pharmaceutical company Sanofi and foreign governments,
after the CEO of Sanofi publicly announced that the United States had “the right
to the largest pre-order.” 48 One day after the announcement, on the heels of
mounting criticism, both the French government and Sanofi announced that the
deal would not move forward. 49 Several other countries acted according to
nationalistic paradigms. India’s Serum Institute—the world’s largest vaccine
manufacturer 50 —initially announced that it was committed to “equitable”
distribution of COVID-19 vaccines globally but soon thereafter narrowed that
commitment by reserving the majority of initial doses for its domestic
population.51
Widespread use of APAs by a reduced number of countries during the
COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the profound allocative disparities resulting
from vaccine nationalism. Within a few months from the beginning of the
pandemic, thirty-two countries had placed APAs for more than fifty percent of

according to the company website. The investment will be made by the state-owned development bank
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau [KfW]. Funds will partly be used to further develop the company’s drug pipeline,
including its COVID-vaccine. Under the agreement, KfW will end up with a 23% stake in CureVac.”).
48
French Pharma Giant Sanofi to Give United States Preference on Future COVID-19 Vaccine,
FRANCE 24 (May 13, 2020), https://www.france24.com/en/20200513-french-pharma-giant-sanofi-to-give-uspreference-on-future-covid-19-vaccine; Covid-19: Sanofi Backpedals on US Vaccine Priority after French
Outrage, FRANCE 24 (May 15, 2020) [hereinafter Sanofi Backpedals], www.france24.com/en/20200514-francesays-unacceptable-for-sanofi-to-give-coronavirus-vaccine-to-us-first (“French drugmaker Sanofi said on
Thursday it would ensure a future vaccine against Covid-19 reaches all regions of the world at the same time, a
day after its CEO angered the French government by saying the US would enjoy priority access. ‘There will be
no particular advance given to any country,’ Serge Weinberg, chairman of the French pharmaceutical giant, told
France 2 television. ‘We are organised with several manufacturing units. Some of them are in the United States
but even more of them are in Europe and France,’ Weinberg said, adding that earlier comments by the company’s
chief executive had been ‘altered’. Paul Hudson, Sanofi’s CEO, told Bloomberg on Wednesday that vaccine
doses produced in the United States could go to US patients first, given the country had supported the research
financially. His comments prompted outrage in France, with French Prime Minister Édouard Philippe stressing
that Sanofi was ‘profoundly French’ and warning that equal access to a vaccine was ‘non-negotiable.’”).
49
See Sanofi Backpedals, supra note 48.
50
About Us, SERUM INST. INDIA PVT. LTD., www.seruminstitute.com/about_us.php.
51
See Zeba Siddiqui, India’s Serum Institute to Make Millions of Potential Coronavirus Vaccine Doses,
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2020) www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-india-vaccine/indias-serum-instituteto-make-millions-of-potential-coronavirus-vaccine-doses-idUSKCN22A2YY (“‘A majority of the vaccine, at
least initially, would have to go to our countrymen before it goes abroad,’ Poonawalla said, adding that Serum
would leave it to the Indian government to decide which countries would get how much of the vaccine and when.
Serum envisages a price of 1,000 rupees per vaccine but governments would give it to people without charge,
he said. Responding in a statement on Wednesday, Wellcome’s Weller said: ‘We need a vaccine that will work
for the world, and any advances must be available to all countries equally, without exception.’ Poonawalla said
that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s office was ‘very closely’ involved and that the company hopes the
government will help cover the cost of making the experimental vaccine.”).
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soon-to-be-available vaccine doses. 52 While effectively in control of the
majority of the worldwide vaccine supply, these thirty-two countries represented
only around thirteen percent of the global population.53 They were also countries
belonging to the higher-income economies of the “Global North”: the group
included Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the member-states of
the European Union, Japan, and Australia. 54 In late 2020, the Duke Global
Health Institute published a study calculating that, given the persisting
imbalances in the global distribution of the first batches of COVID-19 vaccines,
the majority of low-income countries would only be able to fully vaccinate their
populations in 2024.55
At a broader level, vaccine nationalism showcases a fracture between
theoretical approaches to the production and management of health goods and
transactional practices determining the actual allocation of these goods. The
former emphasizes principles of global solidarity and equity,56 while the latter
52
Asher Mullard, How COVID Vaccines Are Being Divvied Up Around the World, NATURE (Nov. 30,
2020), www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03370-6.
53
Id.
54
See Arthur Allen, The Case for Donating US Covid Vaccines Overseas, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Mar. 19, 2021), https://khn.org/news/article/the-case-for-donating-us-covid-vaccines-overseas (“In particular,
Lurie and others are urging the Biden administration to make plans for getting surplus U.S. covid vaccine
supplies overseas once Americans are vaccinated. They note that the administration has secured at least 700
million doses of vaccines—more than enough to fully vaccinate every adult and child in the U.S.—by the end
of July. The current focus must be the United States, which has had more covid cases and deaths than any other
country. But in the longer term, global immunization will be crucial. ‘We need to take care of the problem
everywhere to be able to take care of it anywhere,’ said Dr. Mark Feinberg, president and CEO of the
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, a remark echoed in a petition circulated by leading U.S. scholars. ‘Even
if we get high-level vaccine coverage here, we’ll still be vulnerable to imported variants that are less responsive
to the first-generation vaccines. It’s going to be an ongoing problem.’”).
55
Will Low-Income Countries Be Left Behind When COVID-19 Vaccines Arrive?, DUKE GLOB. HEALTH
INST. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://globalhealth.duke.edu/news/will-low-income-countries-be-left-behind-when-covid-19vaccines-arrive (“A new global assessment of purchasing agreements for COVID-19 vaccines reveals that highincome countries, as well as a few middle-income countries flush with manufacturing capacity, have already
purchased nearly 3.8 billion doses, with options for another five billion. The analysis, released by the Duke
Global Health Innovation Center, shows that many of these countries will be able to vaccinate their entire
populations—and some will be able to do so many times over—before billions of people are vaccinated in lowincome countries. ‘An ambitious effort to create a global system of vaccine equity is being undermined as a
handful of countries—including those who made a commitment to equality—secure as many doses as they
possibly can,’ said Elina Urli Hodges, MSPH, who leads the Center’s Launch and Scale Speedometer, an
initiative that identifies impediments to delivering health innovations to low-income countries. Urli Hodges
added, ‘Countries are hedging bets by making direct deals while also participating in multilateral platforms,
which drives inequality and threatens to prolong a global pandemic.’ While other assessments have warned of
potential inequalities in vaccine access, this new analysis is the first to carefully quantify the amount of vaccine
doses that are being claimed by country-level agreements and how this could delay access to COVID-19
protection across large regions—including sub-Saharan Africa—until almost the middle of the decade.”).
56
Max H. Bazerman et al., How Should We Allocate Scarce Medical Resources?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Apr. 29, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-should-we-allocate-scarce-medical-resources (“Their preferences
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results in a country-based encirclement of transnationally-needed resources.
Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman have aptly characterized this progressive
erosion of cooperative international frameworks as “the globalization of private
knowledge goods and the privatization of global public goods.”57 In this sense,
vaccine nationalism must be understood in connection with other contemporary
sovereignty-asserting behaviors that further contribute to the enclosure—even if
temporary—of health goods and, more broadly, biological resources. This
Article now explores this connection by surveying the closely related
phenomenon of viral sovereignty.58
II. VIRAL SOVEREIGNTY
Just as wealthy countries used capital, research, and manufacturing capacity
to encircle vaccines and their contributory processes, biodiverse but capital-poor
states have increasingly leveraged their genetic resources for individual and
collective gain. 59 “Viral sovereignty” is the term applied when a country
provides access to pathogenic samples as a research input in exchange for
benefits arising from the utilization of those samples to develop drugs and
vaccines.60
Viral sovereignty slowly emerged over the course of vaccine nationalist
episodes covering polio, smallpox, and influenza.
tell us something about fairness principles. ‘First come, first served’ is a morally plausible principle. So is ‘Save
the most years of life.’ Which rule is fairer in the current moment? When participants put themselves in the shoes
of both patients, the majority indicated that saving more life-years is fairer: It’s what they would want for
themselves if they did not know whom they were going to be. Our most important conclusion is not that the
young should be favored over the old, or that any group should be favored over any other, but rather that
decisions should be made through an impartial process.”); see, e.g., Suerie Moon et al., Global Public Goods for
Health: Weaknesses and Opportunities in the Global Health System, 12 HEALTH ECON., POL’Y & L. 195 (2017).
57
Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the
Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279 (2004); see also Gregory Shaffer, International
Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669 (2012).
58
Halabi, supra note 17, at 101 (“Instead of the open system of sharing bacterial and viral human
pathogens that characterized the research system for much of the 20th Century, notions of ‘viral sovereignty,’
access contingent upon provisions like sharing research benefits, and acrimonious negotiations, are far more
common. The increasing barriers to the flow of research material and related data like genetic sequencing
information are posing threats to public health responses and the potential use of such resources in diagnostic,
therapeutic, and vaccine innovation.”).
59
See generally Ciara Staunton & Keymanthrj Moodley, Data Mining and Biological Sample
Exportation from South Africa: A New Wave of Bioexploitation Under the Guise of Clinical Care?, 106 S. AFR.
MED. J. 136, 138 (2016) (“For decades there has been a unidirectional flow of samples out of Africa to various
destinations in developed countries, with no benefit to local populations or local researchers.”).
60
Halabi, supra note 17, at 101 (“Indonesia’s actions introduced the previously unknown concept of ‘viral
sovereignty’ to the scientific sharing process. ‘Viral sovereignty’ refers to situations in which countries assert
that viruses located and isolated from within their territories are their sovereign property.”).
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Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, many low- and middle-income
countries questioned the structure of global biological research as part of a
broader evaluation of the distribution of technological capacity worldwide.
Building technological capacity, in this view, was a crucial part of leveling the
playing field between the poorer states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and
the wealthier states of North America and Europe.61
Because the development of a technological base was perceived as
intricately tied to control over industrial processes applied to raw materials, it
was sovereignty over natural resources that informed much of the technology
distribution debate. In their earliest forms, calls for control over natural
resources covered commodities like petroleum, rubber, and agricultural goods
primarily.62 But the general call for control over natural resources expanded in
the early 1990s to include biological and genetic resources, including
pathogens.63
In 1972, the United Nations held the first of many global conferences on the
Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden. 64 In the decade after the 1972
conference, scientists and non-governmental organizations elevated the issue of
biodiversity to a global policy priority. 65 In 1987, the first steps were taken
toward the Convention on Biological Diversity.66
Eventually, these movements led to the 1992 U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development held in Rio De Janeiro, the result of which
included the Rio Declaration, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the U.N. Convention
to Combat Desertification. The CBD traced a direct line to the earliest debates
on sovereign control over natural resources, which claimed that it was the

61
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development on its Second Session, 272 (UNCTAD II) (Feb.–Mar. 1968), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
td97vol1_en.pdf; PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR
CLIENTS xiv (2010).
62
Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A
Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT’L LAW. 295 (1975).
63
Halabi, supra note 17, at 101.
64
See generally U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 (1972).
65
History of the Convention, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, www.cbd.int/history.
66
See generally UNEP Res. 14/26 (1987) (summarizing the findings of fourteenth session of the
Governing Council of the U.N. Environment Programme [UNEP]). UNEP took place over the course of twelve
meetings in Nairobi in 1987. Id. The following year, UNEP convened the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts
on Biological Diversity, which began work on a legal framework to protect biological diversity. Id.; see also
Convention on Biodiversity, History of the Convention, https://www.cbd.int/history.
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inalienable right of each state to handle natural resources as they saw fit and that
exploitation of these resources—commercially, technologically, etc.—should be
shared “between the investors and the recipient State.”67
Article 2 of the CBD defines “genetic resources” as “genetic material of
actual or potential value.”68 Article 15 incorporates prior informed consent and
mutually agreed terms as conditions for both access and use of resources, while
Article 16 incorporates the demand for technology transfer as a form of benefit
that could be available to provider countries.69
The Convention on Biological Diversity (and the negotiations leading to it)
thus paved the way for the transfer of biological resources to take place through
mediums of proprietary claims—especially government permits and material
transfer agreements—often regulated by governments, rather than through
informal sharing through scientific networks. 70 After the CBD, some

67

See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), ¶ 3, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Dec. 8, 1962).
Convention on Biological Diversity art. 2, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
69
See id. arts. 15, 16(1). See generally GÜNTHER HANDL, DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (STOCKHOLM DECLARATION), 1972 AND THE RIO DECLARATION
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 1992, at 1 (2012), https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/dunche/dunche_e.pdf
(“The Stockholm and Rio Declarations are outputs of the first and second global environmental conferences,
respectively, namely the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972,
and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development [UNCED] in Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14,
1992. Other policy or legal instruments that emerged from these conferences, such as the Action Plan for the
Human Environment at Stockholm and Agenda 21 at Rio, are intimately linked to the two declarations,
conceptually as well as politically. However, the declarations, in their own right, represent signal achievements.
Adopted twenty years apart, they undeniably represent major milestones in the evolution of international
environmental law, bracketing what has been called the ‘modern era’ of international environmental law [Sand,
pp. 33-35]. Stockholm represented a first taking stock of the global human impact on the environment, an attempt
at forging a basic common outlook on how to address the challenge of preserving and enhancing the human
environment. As a result, the Stockholm Declaration espouses mostly broad environmental policy goals and
objectives rather than detailed normative positions. However, following Stockholm, global awareness of
environmental issues increased dramatically, as did international environmental law-making proper. At the same
time, the focus of international environmental activism progressively expanded beyond transboundary and
global commons issues to media-specific and cross-sectoral regulation and the synthesizing of economic and
development considerations in environmental decision-making. By the time of the Rio Conference, therefore,
the task for the international community became one of systematizing and restating existing normative
expectations regarding the environment, as well as of boldly positing the legal and political underpinnings of
sustainable development.”).
70
See Halabi, supra note 17, at 116–117 (“The effect of these movements in international law - toward
greater assertion of sovereign proprietary rights over biological resources - and the practicalities of transferring
biological samples across borders has been profound. The Nagoya Protocol established a complex framework
for regulating scientists’ [including botanical gardens, universities, libraries, and certainly for-profit firms]
ability to conduct research in low- and middle-income countries. Under the Nagoya Protocol, a researcher would
ideally contact the country’s national focal point [NFP], an administrative body suggested by the treaty, to
commence access-and-benefit sharing negotiations. The NFP, in turn, would identify the correct ‘competent
national authority’ to discuss prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms for benefit sharing. While this
68
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governments made it more difficult to obtain resources from their territories.71
The CBD adopted as one of its objectives the promotion of conservation, and
sustainable use, of biological diversity while seeking “fair and equitable”
sharing of benefits derived from their genetic resources.72 The CBD created a
legal zone in which biodiversity-rich countries could set terms for exploitation
and the protection of their citizens to share in the benefits of any
commercialization of their resources. 73 More than sixty nations have created
Access and Benefit Sharing regimes via their domestic laws, with particular
activity from biodiversity-rich states like Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Kenya, the
Philippines, and South Africa.74
In late 2006, Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian flu samples from the WHO’s
Global Influenza Surveillance Network system.75 This constituted a significant
measure since the H5N1 avian flu outbreak that had spiked beginning in early
2005 was not only spreading along avian flyways, but threatened to become
transmissible between humans; those infected experienced a terrifying fifty
percent fatality rate. 76 Indonesia asserted its decision was a response to an
Australian company’s patent on a vaccine derived from a virus sample Indonesia
provided to the WHO’s pathogen-sharing network. 77 More importantly, for
purposes of human pathogen sharing, Indonesia argued that the H5N1 virus
samples that came from its territory constituted the same kinds of natural
resources as petroleum or rubber, as well as forms of biodiversity protected
under Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity.78 Indonesia

seems straightforward, the competent national authority may be a ministry of health, ministry of environment,
ministry of indigenous issues, ministry of interior, or some other department. In Brazil, for example up to nine
ministries may have jurisdiction over the pathogen at issue.”).
71
Jerome H. Reichman, Paul Uhlir & Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Tightening the Regulatory Grip: From the
Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992 to the Nagoya Protocol in 2010, in GOVERNING DIGITALLY
INTEGRATED GENETIC RESOURCES, DATA, AND LITERATURE: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES
FOR A REDESIGNED MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS 89–90 (2016).
72
See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. There are 198 states party to
the CBD. Id. The United States is not a party. See id.
73
Michiel Korthals & Bram De Jonge, Two Different Ethical Notions of Benefit Sharing of Genetic
Resources and Their Implications for Global Development, 28 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 87, 89 (Mar. 2009).
74
Nicolas Pauchard, Access and Benefit Sharing Under the Convention on Biological Diversity and Its
Protocol: What Can Some Numbers Tell Us About the Effectiveness of the Regulatory Regime?, 6 RESOURCES
1 (Feb. 19, 2017).
75
J.S. Malik Peiris, Menno D. de Jong & Yi Guan, Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1): A Threat to Human
Health, 20(2) CLINICAL MICROBIO. REV. 243 (Apr. 2007).
76
Id.
77
David P. Fidler, Influenza Virus Samples, International Law, and Global Health Diplomacy, 14
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 88 (Jan. 1, 2008).
78
Sam Halabi, supra note 17, at 114 (“In 2006, Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian flu samples from WHO
GISRS, compromising efforts to monitor and produce vaccines in response to the avian flu outbreak that
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agreed to resume sharing under an interim agreement that granted it access to
antivirals and vaccines, and the promise to develop a broader international
agreement on influenza pathogen access and benefit sharing. Indonesia’s actions
introduced to the scientific sharing process the theretofore unknown concept of
“viral sovereignty.”79
Soon after, CBD countries negotiated the Nagoya Protocol on Access to
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from
their Utilization (Nagoya Protocol). 80 The Nagoya Protocol regulates
commercial, non-profit, university-driven, and all other forms of
microbiological research that leads to drugs, medical therapies, vaccines, and
other products derived from genetic resources in member states.81 Additionally,
given the limited reach of current international instruments, it fundamentally
changes the nature and process of international scientific research.82
The purpose of the Nagoya Protocol was explicit.83 The CBD, as it was
originally formed, lacked an agreed-upon legal framework for cross-border
threatened to become easily transmissible from birds to humans and then between humans. Indonesia asserted
that its decision was a response to an Australian company’s patent on a vaccine derived from a virus sample that
Indonesia provided to WHO. More importantly for purposes of human pathogen sharing, Indonesia argued that
the H5N1 virus samples it had collected in its territory constituted the same kinds of natural resources as
petroleum or rubber would previously have been considered, as well as a form of biodiversity protected under
Articles 15 and 16 of the CBD. Indonesia agreed to resume sharing under an interim agreement that granted it
access to antivirals and vaccines, and promised to develop a broader international agreement on influenza
pathogen access and benefit sharing. Indonesia’s actions introduced the previously unknown concept of ‘viral
sovereignty’ to the scientific sharing process.”).
79
Dennis Normile, Indonesia to Resume Sharing Under New Terms, 316 SCIENCE 37 (Apr. 6, 2007).
80
Wan Izatul Asma Wan Talaat, Protection of the Associated Traditional Knowledge on Genetic
Resources: Beyond the Nagoya Protocol, 91 PROCEDIA—SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 673 (2013).
81
See Halabi, supra note 17.
82
See id. at 117 (“In some countries, the competent national authority [designated pursuant to the Nagoya
Protocol] will issue permits generally known as ‘internationally recognized certificates of compliance,’ which
‘serve as evidence that the genetic resource which it covers has been accessed in accordance with prior informed
consent and mutually agreed terms as required by the domestic legislation or regulatory requirements of the
Party providing prior informed consent’. The terms of the agreement outline how the samples are to be used and
stored, whether the samples may be kept after the term of the initial permission, whether they should be returned
to the provider or destroyed, and whether the samples or any part thereof may be transferred to third parties and
under which conditions. Benefit-sharing terms cover topics such as how the research results will be disseminated,
how related data will be managed, how intellectual property rights [including monetary terms for royalties and
licenses] will be developed, and how the provider country ought to be acknowledged in research publication.”).
83
See Halabi et al., The Nagoya Protocol and the Legal Structure of Global Biogenomic Research, 45
YALE J. INT’L L. 133, 154 (2020) (“The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization [Nagoya Protocol] aimed to encompass the broader
universe of drugs, medical therapies, agrochemical products, vaccines and other products derived from genetic
resources not clearly governed by the CBD. The Nagoya Protocol, formed to give specific content to Article 15
of the CBD, regulates access to genetic resources in party states and establishes mechanisms for fair and
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. It is committed to the equitable
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enforcement of its international regime, diminishing the ability for providers
subjected to misappropriation of their resources to seek adequate redress.
Additionally, user-country governments were in no way obligated to address
complaints or assist with providing redress.84 After six years of negotiations, the
Nagoya Protocol brought “greater legal certainty and transparency” regarding
the exchange of genetic resources while “reaffirm[ing] and clarif[ying] the
[CBD’s] broad economic scope.” 85 It further addressed issues concerning
scientific research, also neglected by the CBD and created new enforcement
provisions for user and provider nations to implement within their respective
national legal systems.86
III. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL
NORM OF VACCINE ACCESS
A. The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
Thus described, the world between 1993, when the CBD entered into force,
and 2020, when WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic, appeared headed for a
classic prisoner’s dilemma. Biodiverse but capital-poor countries possessed the
biological inputs necessary to create vaccines, but lacked the capacity to develop
and manufacture them.87 Wealthy countries possessed vast capacity to research,
develop, and produce vaccines, but were potentially at risk of lacking the basic
biological information they needed to do so. Indeed, politicized pathogensharing confrontations over MERS-CoV in 2012 and Zika in 2015 suggested
that this was precisely the likely outcome.88 What happened instead was the

sharing of research collaborations and ensuing benefits.”).
84
Evanson Chege Kamau et al., The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit
Sharing: What Is New and What Are the Implications for Provider and User Countries and the Scientific
Community?, 6 L., ENV’T & DEV. J. 246, 249 (2010).
85
Id. at 156 (“The effect of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol is that there are a variety of domestic rules
and regulations for accessing genetic resources all around the world. Some countries are operating under the
ABS [Access and Benefit Sharing] regime outlined in the CBD, others have agreed to comply with both the
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, and others still are yet to implement domestic ABS laws despite being Party to
one or both of these instruments.”).
86
Id. (“The Nagoya Protocol requires its Parties to put in place measures ensuring that users within their
jurisdiction have accessed genetic resources [and any traditional knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and local
communities that is associated with genetic resources] in compliance with the provider nation’s ABS rules. Noncompliance can result in more than just reputational damage to the researchers involved. In some jurisdictions,
non-compliance will attract penalties under civil law [e.g., fines] and even prosecution under criminal law.”).
87
Fidler, supra note 77 (“Without access to Indonesia’s influenza strains, global surveillance was
jeopardized, as was the refinement of diagnostic reagents and the development of intervention strategies, which
depend on the information surveillance provides.”).
88
Halabi, Rourke & Katz, supra note 12 (detailing the politicization of these outbreaks).
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emergence of legal regimes committed to vaccine access for the global
population, even if disparities lingered: the PIP Framework in 2011 and the
COVAX Facility in 2020.
The process that eventually led to the PIP Framework began with the WHO
developing solutions to the problem Indonesia raised in 2006, followed by
Resolution WHA 60.28 by the World Health Assembly in 2007.89 The resolution
required that the Director-General of the WHO “formulate mechanisms and
guidelines, in close consultation with Member States, aimed at ensuring fair and
equitable distribution of pandemic-influenza vaccines at affordable prices in the
event of a pandemic, in order to ensure timely availability of such vaccines to
[low-income] Member States in need.”90 The resolution was an agreed-to text
that conveyed national level decision-making based on the juxtaposition of the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Health Regulations
(2005).
There are two components to the PIP framework: (1) the sharing of influenza
viral samples to members of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and
Response System, and (2) the sharing of viral samples with vaccine
manufacturers in return for benefits shared with the WHO and its members.91
The vaccine manufacturers and some other related industrial players pay to
support the system. This model ended the previous ad hoc influenza vaccine
donations by vaccine manufacturers, and created a system in which influenza
vaccines would be contractually guaranteed to low-income countries in
exchange for biological material through a Standard Material Transfer
Agreement. 92 The PIP framework stipulates that, in exchange for biological
material, vaccine manufacturers virtually guarantee a percent of their real-time
vaccine production to the WHO. The WHO, in the event of an influenza
outbreak, then transfers the vaccine to the country in need. 93 As of 2021,
seventy-one Standard Material Transfer Agreements had been entered into by
89
WHO, World Health Assembly Res. 60.28, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza
Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits.
90
Mark Eccleston-Turner, The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework: A Viable Procurement
Option for Developing States?, 17 MED. L. INT’L 227, 228 (2017) (“Prior to the Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness [PIP] Framework being enacted by the World Health Organization [WHO] in 2011, much
discussion on access to pandemic influenza vaccines [PIVs] had centred on the fact that samples of the virus
used to produce a PIV were likely to have been supplied by developing states, which then struggled to purchase
the resulting vaccine.”).
91
Halabi, supra note 17.
92
Michelle Rourke et al., Access and Benefit-Sharing: Implications for Accessing Biological Samples for
United Nations Secretary-General Mechanism Investigations, GEO. UNIV. MED. CTR., CTR. GLOB. HEALTH SCI.
& SEC. 1, 2 (2019).
93
Sam F. Halabi, International Intellectual Property Shelters, 90 TUL. L. REV. 903 (2016).
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the WHO, twenty-nine of which promised benefits (academic research centers,
who also enter the agreements, rarely offer benefits).94 The PIP framework was
the first international agreement to address the inequalities of vaccine access and
has been described as a “milestone for global health”.95
The Indonesian (and supporting) government(s) saw the negotiations
themselves as a key victory in the legal reach of the CBD while high-income
governments saw the relatively limited language of the resolution as
acknowledging the reality that vaccine access is a meaningful global objective
without binding their interests (or of their pharmaceutical companies) too
stringently.96
B. The COVAX Facility
When atypical pneumonia cases arose in China in late 2019, a new chapter
in viral sovereignty emerged.97 While the genetic sequence of SARS-CoV-2 was
shared in early January 2020, the actual biological sample sharing was delayed.
But for the rapid spread of the pathogen worldwide (rendering sharing less
relevant), it is not clear the same claims may not have emerged. However, as
recounted in Section I.B., the spread of vaccine nationalism was met with the

94
WHO, Influenza: Standard Material Transfer Agreements (SMTA2), https://www.who.int/initiatives/
pandemic-influenza-preparedness-framework/standard-material-transfer-agreement-2-(smta2) (last visited Feb.
22, 2022).
95
Eccleston-Turner, supra note 90.
96
Id. (“The Framework has been hailed as an innovative mechanism for guaranteeing access to vaccines
and affordable life-saving drugs during an influenza pandemic. A number of papers have considered the PIP
Framework and attempted to determine the impact the vaccine stockpile it creates will have on procurement of
PIV in developing states. However, some of the literature expresses concern that the Framework is unable to
make any real changes to vaccine allocation due to its inability to close the gap between developed and
developing states where procurement of PIV is concerned. This literature has only considered the benefit sharing
provisions of the SMTAs as they were presented in the appendix of the PIP Framework, as at the time, no
SMTAs had been concluded with PIV manufacturers. The major development since this literature was generated
is the fact that nine SMTAs have now been concluded between the WHO and pandemic influenza vaccine
manufacturers. Each of these agreements outlines the ‘Obligations of the Company’ agreed between the WHO
and pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers, and it is the content of these obligations which is the focus of
this Article. Through examining the content of the Obligations of the Company which have been secured by the
WHO, I argue this Article gives a clearer indication of the true practical impact the PIP stockpile will have on
procurement of PIV during the next pandemic.”).
97
Fidler, supra note 26, at 749 (“With COVID-19, history is repeating itself. Countries with the resources
to obtain vaccines have not subordinated their needs and capacities to the objective of global, equitable access.
And the worldwide spread of the coronavirus eliminates leverage that viral sovereignty might have provided
countries without such means. International and nongovernmental organizations launched an ad hoc effort—the
COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility—to achieve equitable access . . . In keeping with the
longstanding pattern of political behavior during pandemics, vaccines will eventually reach most populations,
but only after powerful countries have protected themselves.”).
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COVAX Facility—a countervailing effort to ensure access to vaccines for the
world’s most vulnerable populations.98
The COVAX Facility originated within a broader international collaboration
known as the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator. 99 The ACT
Accelator began as an initiative led by the World Bank Group (WBG), WHO,
G20, European Commission, and a consortium of major global public health
non-governmental organizations (including the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation and other private donors), to advance the goal of fostering the
development and production of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines to
combat the COVID-19 pandemic.100 The ACT Accelerator, launched in April
2020, is broader than COVAX and includes four “pillars”: (1) the Diagnostic
Pillar supported by the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics and the
Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculous, and Malaria (Global Fund), (2) the
Therapeutics Pillar supported by Unitaid and Wellcome Trust, (3) the Health
Systems Pillar supported by the Global Fund, WBG, and WHO, and (4) the
Vaccine Pillar supported by GAVI, CEPI, and WHO.101
After being hosted by UNICEF for almost a decade, GAVI became, in 2009,
an independent international institution under Swiss law.102 Now identified as
its own international organization, GAVI was the first organization to receive
such recognition under the Swiss Host State Act.103 GAVI is now a foundation
under Swiss law and an independent international institution with privileges and
immunities similar to those of U.N. agencies.104 CEPI is even newer, having
been formed under Norwegian law and maintaining a governance structure that
incorporates
formal
international
organizations;
non-governmental
organizations; and governments, including their medicines regulators.

98
Coronavirus Global Response: Access to COVID-19 Tools-Accelerator Facilitation Council Holds
Inaugural Meeting, WHO (Sept. 10, 2020), www.who.int/news-room/detail/10-09-2020-coronavirus-globalresponse-access-to-covid-19-tools-accelerator-facilitation-council-holds-inaugural-meeting.
99
Berkley, supra note 15.
100
The Scramble for Vaccines and the COVAX Facility, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 1, 3 (Aug. 19,
2020), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200811_Scramble_Vaccines.pdf.;
Donor Profiles, GAVI (Dec. 15, 2020), www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/funding/donor-profiles.
101
ACT-Accelerator Update: Publication of Investment Cases, WHO (June 26, 2020) [hereinafter ACTAccelerator Update], www.who.int/news-room/detail/26-06-2020-act-accelerator-update; Jonathan C. Carlson,
Strengthening the Property Rights Regime for Plant Genetic Resources: The Role of the World Bank, 6
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 112–13 (1996) (identifying the evolving role of WBG from discrete
project funding to broader, structural efforts).
102
GAVI Recognised as International Institution, GAVI (June 23, 2009), https://www.gavi.org/news/
media-room/gavi-recognised-international-institution.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 47.
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The Vaccine Pillar, now known simply as COVAX,105 was established in
June 2020. 106 It was founded to support the quick and safe development,
manufacture, and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines worldwide. 107 COVAX
aimed to deliver two billion doses of a safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine by
the end of 2021.108 In order to achieve this objective, COVAX invested across a
wide portfolio of vaccine candidates using contributions from eighty-nine “selffinancing” governments and supporting international organizations and charities
and, at the same time, required financial commitments from ninety-two “donor
supported” governments that will receive subsidized prices for doses.109
CEPI is an international public–private partnership committed to developing
vaccines for otherwise neglected diseases.110 Within COVAX, CEPI leads the
development and manufacturing workstream, which supports R&D and
manufacturing expansion through direct financial investments.111 GAVI is the
105

The Vaccine Pillar is also referred to as “COVAX Facility” or “the Facility” in online sources.
ACT-Accelerator Update, supra note 101, at 3.
107
Id.
108
More than 150 Countries Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility, WHO (July 15,
2020),
www.who.int/news-room/detail/15-07-2020-more-than-150-countries-engaged-in-covid-19-vaccineglobal-access-facility.
109
172 Countries and Multiple Candidate Vaccines Engaged in COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access
Facility, WHO (Aug. 24, 2020) [hereinafter 172 Countries], www.who.int/news-room/detail/24-08-2020-172countries-and-multiple-candidate-vaccines-engaged-in-covid-19-vaccine-global-access-facility; COVAX Announces
Additional Deals to Access Promising COVID-19 Vaccine Candidates; Plans Global Rollout Starting Q1 2021,
WHO (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/18-12-2020-covax-announces-additional-deals-to-accesspromising-covid-19-vaccine-candidates-plans-global-rollout-starting-q1-2021 (describing CEPI-Support candidate
vaccines, including: Invio—United States [Phase II]; Moderna—United States [Phase III]; CureVac—Germany
[Phase IIB/III]; Institute Pasteur/Merck/Themis—France, United States, and Austria [Phase I];
AstraZeneca/University of Oxford—United Kingdom and Northern Ireland [Phase III]; University of Hong
Kong—China [Preclinical]; Novavax—United States [Phase III]; Clover Biopharmaceuticals—China [Phase I];
and University of Queensland/CSL—Australia [Phase I]).
110
Dave Kovaleski, CEPI Invests $4.9M in Consortium to Develop COVID-19 Vaccine, HOMELAND
PREPAREDNESS NEWS (Mar. 23, 2020), https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/46200-cepiinvests-4-9m-inconsortium-to-develop-covid-19-vaccine.
111
172 Countries, supra note 109. The Gavi board agreed in July 2020 that the following countries will
be supported the COVAX Advance Market Commitment: Low income: Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, and Yemen. Id. Lower-middle income: Angola, Algeria,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti,
Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe. Id. Additional IDA eligible: Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Kosovo, Maldives, Marshall
Islands, Samoa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Id.
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lead for the vaccine procurement and delivery, as well as the COVAX Advance
Market Commitment, which helps to finance low- and lower-middle-income
countries’ access to a future COVID-19 vaccine. 112 GAVI was originally
established to continue long-standing global immunization for childhood
diseases that had stalled around the end of the 1980s. In a renewed effort to
complete the work that began with the WHO’s Expanded Programme on
Immunization, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, together with WHO,
UNICEF, WBG, and several large pharmaceutical firms, established GAVI.113
GAVI is funded through the International Finance Facility for Immunisation
(IFFIm), which is itself funded by the governments of Australia, Brazil, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. 114 Under the GAVI model, low-income and middle-income states
identify immunization needs, apply for funding, and implement approved
vaccination programs.115 As of April 8, 2021, COVAX had shipped over 38
million vaccines to over 100 economies, a broader set of international actors
than recognized governments.116
IV. THE FUTURE OF PANDEMIC VACCINE ACCESS AFTER COVID-19
After the world’s experience with Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa in
2014 to 2016, the WHO’s International Health Regulations Review Committee
was called for the use of the PIP Framework’s principles to be applied to a
broader set of pathogens including Ebola and Zika.117 Indeed, that remains a
possibility after the significant efforts required to spontaneously form and adapt
112
113
114

Kovaleski, supra note 110, at 2–3; Eccleston-Turner, supra note 23, at 327.
History of GAVI, GAVI, https://perma.cc/2ZTP-YFK4.
Overview, INT’L FIN. FACILITY OF IMMUNISATION, https://perma.cc/4GJM-C4GL (last visited Dec. 23,

2019).
115

See GAVI, HOW WE WORK TOGETHER 14 (May 2019).
COVAX Reaches over 100 Economies, 42 Days After First International Delivery, WHO (Apr. 8, 2021),
www.who.int/news/item/08-04-2021-covax-reaches-over-100-economies-42-days-after-first-international-delivery.
117
Rep. of Dir. Gen., Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): Report of the Review
Committee on the Role of the International Health Regulations (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and Response,
WHO A69/21, at 35 (May 13, 2016), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA69/A69_21-en.pdf (“One
incentive-based approach is for WHO to provide or facilitate technical and financial support. Incentivizing
compliance of countries through collaboration and support is a feature that the IHR share with a large number
of other instruments and multilateral treaties. Innovative funding sources within the WHO context could improve
implementation of the IHR. For example, a number of States Parties and the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers pointed favourably to the PIP Framework. Under the PIP Framework, influenza
vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical manufacturers who use the WHO Global Influenza surveillance and
Response System [GISRS]—a WHO-coordinated network of public health laboratories—pay an annual cash
contribution to WHO. WHO uses the funds to strengthen influenza preparedness and response capacities in
countries that require such support. Manufacturers also agree to provide benefits such as pandemic influenza
vaccines, antiviral medicines and other pandemic related products or technologies at the time of a pandemic.”).
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COVAX to the COVID-19 threat. Early in the pandemic, a team of researchers
at Fudan University called for precisely that mechanism as the most efficient
means to allocate COVID-19 vaccines.118 But the establishment of COVAX and
the formation of the other ACT Accelerator Pillars have also spurred calls for
more permanent legal solutions to the challenge COVID-19 has posed to the
world.
A novel proposal that emerged alongside the COVID-19 pandemic is a
pandemic-specific treaty, which might impose additional, specific obligations
on countries during the next international infectious disease emergency. In
November 2020, Charles Michel, President of the European Council, began
circulating the idea of an “international pandemic treaty” at the Paris Peace
Forum.119 In December 2020, Michel met with Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus,
the Director General of the WHO, to discuss the treaty. 120 In January 2021,
Tedros endorsed the pandemic treaty proposal “as a way to guarantee countries’
political commitment to fighting future disease outbreaks.” 121 He expressed
WHO’s support of such a treaty, saying “[i]t will give the [International Health
Regulations] the political dimension” they need.122
The international treaty proposal is modelled after the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which went into force in 2005.123 The
FCTC was implemented to curb tobacco consumption and marks the only time
WHO used its treaty-making authority under Article 19 of its constitution.124 It
transformed public health functions into legally binding obligations and
“showed the feasibility of working with non-health sectors within an
international legal system, the feasibility of negotiating further protocols and
118

Bingzhe Li et al., supra note 20.
David M. Herszenhorn, Charles Michel Proposes ‘International Pandemic Treaty’, POLITICO (Nov.
12, 2020), www.politico.eu/article/charles-michel-proposes-international-pandemic-treaty.
120
Svĕt Lustig Vijay, WHO Proposes New “Pandemic Treaty” to Tighten Global Monitoring and
Enforcement of Disease Outbreak Response, HEALTH POL’Y WATCH (Jan. 20, 2021), https://healthpolicywatch.news/who-proposes-new-pandemic-treaty-to-tighten-global-monitoring-and-enforcement-of-diseaseoutbreak-response.
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Stephanie Nebehay, Catherine Evans & Peter Graff, WHO Chief Welcomes EU Proposal for Pandemic
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Vijay, supra note 120.
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Convention on Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Guidelines Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 144 GA.
J. INT’L. L. 138 (2010) (analyzing the history and provisions of the FCTC).
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Haik Nikogosian & Ilona Kickbusch, The Case for an International Pandemic Treaty, 372 BMJ n.527
(Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n527; VIJAY, supra note 120; see also Halabi, supra
note 16 (analyzing the constitutional authorities WHO may use to affect international law and its general
hesitation to do so).
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guidelines promptly, and the power to safeguard the interests of health in the
face of conflicting agendas and legal disputes.”125 A pandemic treaty would be
the first global public health accord since the FCTC.126
Conceivably, an international pandemic treaty could be negotiated under
WHO, the United Nations, or both.127 While proceeding under WHO is the most
likely possibility, there are concerns about “WHO’s ability to cover important
areas such as finance, trade, supplies, law enforcement, and the broader
economic and social disruptions caused by a pandemic.”128 Although proceeding
under the United Nations may be more effective on these issues, the “highly
political UN environment in New York” could make it more challenging to
hammer out the details.129 The U.N. system’s valuable features in this regard
include: cross-sectoral working on very large scale challenges (e.g., the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change); legal provisions that are highly
relevant to pandemics (e.g., the Nagoya Protocol on use of genetic resources);
joint treaty administration by existing U.N.-system bodies (e.g., the Protocol on
Water and Health); a human-rights-based approach (e.g., U.N. human rights
treaties); and other important treaty practices such as finance mechanisms (e.g.,
the Global Environment Facility for environmental conventions) and monitoring
compliance (e.g., the International Narcotics Control Board for drug control
conventions).130
Perhaps the easiest path would be “[a] framework convention approach,
which leaves some of the detail to later protocols and guidelines[.]”131 This path,
however, would require countries to “agree on short definite timelines for
negotiating such instruments.”132 A final consideration would “be to draft and
provisionally negotiate articles requiring specialized expertise in Geneva before
final negotiations in New York[.]”133 A treaty under both WHO and the United
Nations could prove “the most viable way forward given the urgency and the
implications of the current pandemic beyond health to livelihoods, economics,
security, solidarity, and human rights.”134
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Alternatively, a broad UN framework on pandemics “with built-in power
and mandate to negotiate a treaty could be” considered.135 Features that could be
useful for an international pandemic treaty include “a focus on risk management,
responsibilities across sectors and stakeholders, protection of livelihoods along
with protection of lives and health, use of UN interagency mechanisms, and
global targets to measure progress.”136 A framework such as this, however, is
not a legally binding instrument, even though it could lead to one in the future.137
With respect to vaccine development, Tedros called on all member states to
join a voluntary initiative to share samples of infectious pathogens through the
new Swiss-based “biohub.”138 So far, Italy, South Africa, and Thailand have
signed on to share SARS-CoV-2 samples through the biohub initative.139 Tedros
advocated that the initiative might help combat the difficulties in sharing genetic
material in order to “help us in the emergency preparedness and response.”140
The uncertainties of the initiative that still need to be defined include benefits
that member states will gain through the biohub and the extent to which member
states will have access to available data.141
Various member states also called for additional measures to aid in pandemic
responses. Norway’s delegate suggested a WHO-mandated program “for
generating knowledge on non pharmaceutical interventions,” such as wearing
masks, physical distancing, or lockdowns.142 In response, Mike Ryan, WHO’s
head of emergencies, concurred that “[w]e do need to work to understand how
to implement, how to measure them, and how to monitor them” as tools for the
community.143
According to Charles Michel, an international pandemic treaty would better
protect citizens by allowing for a “stronger international commitment to prevent
[pandemics]” through quicker and more coordinated response times that would
ensure proper supply of medical equipment and improved information
exchange.144 Exchangeable information would include data regarding virus and
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infectious disease outbreaks.145 Sharing this information, however, may require
signatory countries to contribute all the data they have on an outbreak.146
In theory, an international pandemic treaty could deal with a variety of
issues, including a fair and equitable distribution structure for vaccines.147 In
order to be successful, a treaty “must cover disruptions both in and beyond
health, bind all relevant sectors, engage international actors, activate financial
mechanisms, define signatories’ obligations (and breaches), and agree
mechanisms to evaluate compliance.”148
CONCLUSION
From an institutional governance perspective, the emerging lessons on
nationalism and sovereignty-asserting behaviors in the context of pandemic
responses also reinforce the centrality of the role of WHO as the global public
health coordinating mechanism. While WHO has been often criticized for both
its bureaucracy and some aspects of pandemic and epidemic response, the
COVID-19 pandemic once again showed that WHO remains critical to the
development of new international legal regimes that can assist in navigating
global crises.149
This Article has underscored how nationalistic or otherwise sovereigntyasserting behaviors fare poorly in the face of transnational health crises,
challenging global governance at its core; taken to their extremes, the realpolitik
result of these trends could be stymied by vaccine research, vaccine hoarding,
and a slowing economy. A multilateral approach, however, obtains cooperation
and promised equitable distribution. This cooperation is impossible without
international organizations’ contributions to the global preparedness and
145
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response to the coronavirus pandemic.’ ‘International pandemic preparedness will be a major priority for the
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plan that was announced at the U.N. General Assembly last year. ‘The five point plan includes a worldwide
network of zoonotic research hubs, developing global manufacturing capacity for treatments and vaccines, the
design of a global pandemic early warning system, the agreement of global protocols for a future health
emergency and the reduction of trade barriers.’”).
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response system for health threats, and WHO’s contributions in particular.
Governments and companies look to WHO’s contributions when infectious
disease threats emerge and, so far, WHO has met each challenge with sustained
solutions. In the context of COVID-19, it did so in close coordination with CEPI
and GAVI. Each of these solutions, in turn, has required the expansion of
governance to private actors—the global pharmaceutical industry—in both the
PIP Framework and COVAX. Together, these trends portend greater influence
for norms of global redistribution of wealth, collective response to global health
security threats, and mutually agreed governance solutions housed at
international institutions with strong reputations for technical competence.

